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INTRODUCTION 
Poverty and affluence, as well as the transition from one 
State to the other, are assumed to have consequences that mani-
fest themselves beyond the economic domain. This observation 
is valid both at micro (individual) and macro (group or societal) 
levels. Material conditions, whether viewed from a static or a dy-
namic perspective, are believed to affect human and institutional 
functioning in a variety of ways—negative and positive, modest 
and profound, simple and complex. Substantial academic re-
sources have been devoted to exploring the many dimensions of 
this relationship. 
It has been argued, inter alia, that rapid economic growth 
accompanied by meaningful structural shifts—"development," 
"industrialization," or "modernization"—almost invariably leads 
to "progress" (employing the liberal definition of the term) in 
the political realm.1 Authoritarian regimes become less arbitrary 
and oppressive, and eventually they give way to systems based on 
the rule of law and that reflect democratic principles.2 Afflu-
ence thus generates "secondary benefits"—notably in the form 
of political freedom, equality, and accountability (of course, the 
social and environmental costs should not be overlooked).3 
This proposition has been addressed largely from a domes-
tic standpoint. In recent years, however, there have been at-
tempts to examine it in the international context. Specifically, it 
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1. See, e.g., Seymour M. Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy, 53 AM. P O L . S o . 
REV. 69, 75 (1959). 
2. See Adam Przeworski & Fernando Limongi, Modernization, 49 WORLD P O L . 155, 
157 (1997). 
3. See Lipset, supra note 1, at 75. 
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has been claimed that high standards of living are associated 
with a tendency on the part of countries to pursue their goals 
through peaceful means.4 This may be partly attributable to af-
fluence itself in that those fortunate enough to enjoy it may have 
too much to lose from serious international disruption to con-
template resorting to violence in most circumstances.5 Another 
explanation lies in the possibility that some of the "secondary 
effects," such as the rule of law and democracy, are conducive to 
peaceful coexistence.6 
If the prevailing ideas with regard to the linkages among 
economic growth, political development, and non-belligerence 
are well-founded, it may be legitimate to adopt a basically san-
guine outlook concerning the quality of life across the world and 
the stability of the international system. Standards of living are 
clearly improving on the whole, although there are obviously ex-
ceptions to the norm. Moreover, notwithstanding the adverse 
impact of factors somehow insulated from mainstream economic 
forces, e.g., religious extremism, the trend is sufficiently power-
ful to suggest that, on the face of it, expectations signaling that 
the movement toward a relatively enlightened domestic and 
global order will be sustained are not misplaced.7 
This should have favorable implications for China, ceteris 
paribus. Unlike India, the world's most populous countr}', China 
still relies predominantly on the "rule of man" (as distinct from 
the rule of law) and is by no means ready to embrace democ-
racy.8 Its foreign policy stance has not been overly aggressive for 
some time,9 but China may have not acted, at least consistently 
and unambiguously so, in a manner that reflects its size and sta-
tus as a leading regional power. The rapid economic growth it 
has experienced—a pattern that should remain intact—might 
thus contribute toward internal relaxation and external modera-
tion. 
Both the internal and external sides of the picture merit 
careful consideration. However, this Essay focuses, from a me-
dium-term perspective (the long-term dynamics are more diffi-
4. See BRUCE RL'SSKTT, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC: PEACE 119 (1993). 
5. See, e.g., id. at 28-29. 
6. See id. at 29-30. 
7. See id. at 137-38. 
8. See NEIL C. HUGHES, CHINA'S ECONOMIC CHALLENGE 195-97 (2002). 
9. See id. at 192-93. 
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cult to come to grips with), exclusively on the former. This is 
arguably the critical element in the equation. Tangible progress 
on the domestic front would be of greater significance, given the 
backdrop. China is so far from satisfying the "minimum" stan-
dards in this respect, even from an Asian standpoint, that it is the 
side that needs to be accorded a higher priority.10 As indicated, 
internal forces can also shape events in the external arena—the 
relationship holds in the opposite direction as well, but appar-
ently to a lesser extent—and this is another reason for the do-
mestic orientation displayed in this Essay. 
I. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
Seymour M. Lipset placed the relationship between the two 
key variables highlighted in this Essay—economic development 
and democracy—firmly on the academic agenda more than four 
decades ago. The eminent American political sociologist as-
serted in the late 1950s, in light of his extensive empirical re-
search, that the former sowed the seeds of the latter.11 This posi-
tion has subsequently received reinforcement from a large num-
ber of other scholarly sources.12 It has also been subjected to 
critical scrutiny and even seriously challenged.13 Indeed, it has 
occasionally fallen out of favor and has at times been consigned 
to oblivion.14 However, it has weathered the onslaughts and ex-
pressions of indifference—reemerging in an increasingly elabo-
rate and perhaps better packaged form.15 
The appeal of Lipset's hypothesis can be appreciated by 
studying the linkages between per capita income and the nature 
of the regime (ranging from authoritarian to democratic). The 
aggregate patterns, whether assessed informally or dissected sta-
10. See id. at 186. 
11. See SEYMOUR M. LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN (1981); see also Lipset, supra note 1, at 
69. 
12. See generally REEXAMINING DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS IN H O N O R OF SEYMOUR MARTIN 
LIPSET (Gary Marks & Larry Diamond eds., 1992) [hereinafter REEXAMING DEMOCRACY]. 
13. See Zehra F. Arat, Democracy and Economic Development: Modernization Theory Re-
visited, 21 COMP. P O L . STUD. 21, 30 (1988); see also Lev S. Gonick & Robert M. Rosh, The 
Structural Constraints of the World Economy on National Political Development, 21 COMP. POL. 
STUD. 171, 189 (1988). 
14. See Arat, supra note 13, at 34. 
15. See generally REEXAMINING DEMOCRACY, supra note 12. 
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tistically, provide solid support for his theory.16 At that level, the 
factual evidence is simply overwhelming and there are no com-
pelling grounds to dismiss it as spurious. The sole reason for 
possibly injecting a note of caution into the argument is that the 
aggregate patterns may obscure different configurations that 
could be discerned by probing deeper below the surface. 
Such probing does not constitute an entirely unproductive 
exercise for if nothing else, it introduces a degree of complexity 
into what may legitimately be portrayed as a one-dimensional 
picture. Specifically, by broadening the analytical framework 
and engaging in multi-level scanning, one may detect variations 
indicative of a potentially more intricate conceptual structure 
than originally assumed. Perhaps most importantly, it becomes 
apparent that the positive relationship between economic devel-
opment and political liberalization may not necessarily hold in 
all circumstances or that it may need to be qualified in order to 
render it better capable of explaining specific cases which, on 
the face of it, do not seem to fit into the mold. 
On this basis, it may thus be possible to posit that democ-
racy may take root as countries experience economic develop-
ment or, alternatively, that it may be the result of other influ-
ences, while at the same time more likely to endure in developed 
countries. These are two distinct theoretical perspectives, albeit 
by no means mutually exclusive ones. The former is referred to 
as "endogenous" and the latter is referred to as "exogenous."17 
The Lipset formulation may hence not encompass all contingen-
cies. While it has been refined over the years, it falls more read-
ily into the endogenous category. 
Because one is faced with just two regime types, it may be 
concluded that democracies come into existence as dictatorships 
fade away. To argue Lipset-style that democracies are the by-
product of economic development is equivalent to claiming that 
dictatorships disintegrate as countries controlled by them pro-
gress on the economic front. This claim has a salient sociologi-
cal dimension in that it reflects the observation that, as standards 
of living improve, the social structure grows in complexity and 
16. See Ross E. Burkhart & Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Comparative Democracy, 88 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 903, 906 (1994). 
17. See Przeworski & Limongi, supra note 2, at 156-57. 
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turns more fluid.18 Pockets of autonomy emerge (capital, labor, 
the skilled professions) and information begins to circulate 
freely.19 Dictatorial power is difficult to exercise effectively in 
such an environment.20 
The endogenous perspective is a variant of "modernization" 
theory. The underlying premise is that there is one general so-
cial process that culminates in full-fledged democracy.21 Mod-
ernization consists of a gradual differentiation and specialization 
of social structures that leads to a decoupling of political ele-
ments from other parts of the edifice and paves the way for de-
mocracy.22 The specific causal chains feature interaction among 
variables such as industrialization, urbanization, communica-
tion, mobilization, and political incorporation—with the equa-
tion moving inexorably toward its final destination: democ-
racy/ 
Yet, one may consider the idea that dictatorships are equally 
likely to fade away and democracies to come into existence at 
any level of development. A host of other relevant factors could 
be at work, while economic forces, the pillars of modernization, 
play no decisive role. After all, it has been noted that some key 
European countries democratized because of wars, rather than 
as the inevitable outcome of economic development,24 and a 
similar pattern was witnessed in the wake of the Argentinian de-
feat in the Malvinas/Falklands and elsewhere.25 It is also not un-
common for an authoritarian regime to collapse following the 
death of a well-entrenched founding dictator (post-Franco Spain 
being an obvious example) or due to an internal or external 
shock (economic crisis, foreign pressures, etc.).26 
If dictatorships fade away and democracies come into exis-
tence randomly in relation to development, this would not nec-
essarily be inconsistent with the observation that there are more 
democracies among affluent countries than among poor ones. 
18. See id. 
19. See id. at 157. 
20. See id. 
21. See id. at 158. 
22. See id. 
23. See id. 
24. See id. 
25. See Goran Therborn, The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy, NEW LEFT 
REV., May-June 1977, at 3, 19-27. 
26. See Przeworski & Limongi, supra note 2, at 158. 
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The point is that even if the emergence of democracy is inde-
pendent of the level of development, the probability of such a 
regime enduring may be greater if it has been established in an 
environment characterized by high standards of living. One 
would thus expect a pattern whereby democracies emerge ran-
domly with regard to levels of development, but crumble in the 
poorer countries and endure in the wealthier ones. Democracy 
hence materializes exogenously as a deus ex machina. It en-
dures if a country is modern, yet it is not the inescapable effect 
of modernization.27 
Those who examine political reality from an exogenous per-
spective accord considerable weight to shocks, both internal and 
external, in explaining the transition from authoritarianism to 
democracy and reversals encountered in the process.28 It should 
be emphasized, however, that they view such shocks as a source 
of instability rather than merely as a catalyst for liberal metamor-
phosis.29 On the negative side, shocks may account for the fra-
gility of democratic institutions in poor countries. Such coun-
tries are particularly susceptible to economic crises, which un-
dermine the delicate social fabric and hinder political 
progress.30 
One need not undergo a full conversion to exogenous logic 
to question, mildly or otherwise, the assumptions underlying its 
endogenous counterpart. Some researchers thus argue that the 
co-movement on the economic and democratic fronts may not 
necessarily follow a linear path.31 At the intermediate stages of 
modernization, during which the rate of output expansion—and 
the pace of social change in general—accelerates, political re-
gimes that are subject to competitive pressures may falter.32 This 
may well prove to be a temporary phase and one should not re-
27. See id. at 158-59. 
28. See Larry Diamond, Introduction: Persistence, Erosion, Breakdown, and Renewal, in 
DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: LATIN AMERICA 1, 38 (Larry Diamond et al. eds., 
1989). 
29. See id. at 38-39. 
30. See id. at 34. 
31. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 6 (1968); 
see also GULLLERMO O ' D O N N E L L , MODERNIZATION AND BUREAUCRATIC AUTHORITARIANISM: 
STUDIES IN SOUTH AMERICAN POLITICS 5 n.8 (1973). 
32. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 31, at 49-53; see also O ' D O N N E L L , supra note 31, at 
6-8, 74-76. 
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ject the endogenous perspective on that basis. Nevertheless, an 
adjustment to the overall architecture may be warranted. 
The criticisms and proliferation of alternative models have 
barely made a dent in the endogenous facade. It remains by far 
the most effective analytical tool for explaining the emergence 
and persistence of democratic structures.33 The new endoge-
nous explanatory frameworks do not correspond in every respect 
to their predecessors. There is currently a tendency to proceed 
from the point of origin (economic development) to the final 
destination (democracy) indirectly rather than directly.34 Politi-
cal theorists who adopt this perspective stress particularly the 
role of intervening variables, such as economic equality or ine-
quality, through which the forces of modernization apparently 
exert their influence.35 
Some even produce evidence in support of the contention 
that democracy is not "caused" by rising per capita income (a 
proxy for development) per se, but by other changes, which ma-
terialize in the course of modernization—increasing economic 
equality being the most prominent.36 A number of reasons have 
been offered for this phenomenon. One qualifies as unconven-
tional in that it centers on shifts in the political power dynamics: 
As countries develop, incomes become more equally distrib-
uted. Income equality means that the redistributive scheme 
that would win democratic support (the one supported by the 
median voter) would deprive the rich of less income than the 
one the median voter would support if income distribution 
were highly unequal. Hence the rich find a democratic tax 
structure to be less expensive for them as their country gets 
wealthier, and they are more willing to countenance democ-
ratization.37 
Such enhancements have enriched the endogenous per-
spective and have reinforced its dominant position in this theo-
retical domain.38 Nevertheless, the competing, less deterministic 
models have by no means receded into the background and con-
33. See Carles Boix & Susan C. Stokes, Endogenous Democratization, 55 WORLD POL. 
517, 519, 531, 545 (2003). 
34. See id. at 540-44. 
35. See id. at 540, 543-44. 
36. See CARLES BOIX, DEMOCRACY AND REDISTRIBUTION 1, 19-20 (2003). 
37. Boix & Stokes, supra note 33, at 539-40. 
38. See TATU VANHANEN, PROSPECTS OF DEMOCRACY 21 (1997). 
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tinue to command scholarly attention.39 The notion of exoge-
nous change is intuitively too appealing to be dismissed lightly. 
Structural shifts in the political arena may be induced by stimuli 
originating outside the powerful modernization engine in cer-
tain circumstances.40 Indeed, to deny actors in that arena any 
measure of discretion does not seem to be a very realistic pro-
position. 
Exogenous-type, agent-centric explanatory frameworks per-
haps swing excessively in the opposite direction by portraying 
democracy as principally the result of discretion exercised by 
elites across the political spectrum.41 Such players may proceed 
deliberately toward that goal, albeit in a strategically complex 
fashion (featuring elaborate maneuvers and bargaining), irre-
spective of the stage of economic development (or, for that mat-
ter, prevailing institutional configuration).42 Whether or not 
one is inclined to embrace wholly radical departures of this vari-
ety from the endogenous norm, they at least serve the purpose 
of allowing students of the politico-legal scene in rapidly growing 
China to approach claims that the country is destined to evolve 
before long into a rule-driven democracy with a modicum of 
healthy skepticism. 
II. THE CHINA CONTEXT 
The endogenous perspective reigns supreme, without nec-
essarily restricting unduly the scope for other viewpoints, be-
cause no factor may account for the emergence and persistence 
of democracy over time as well as economic development.43 
Given this pattern and the spread of modernization from the 
"core" of the international system to its "periphery"—notably, 
against the backdrop of market liberalization and globaliza-
tion—there has been an increasing optimism about the outlook 
39. See generally Przeworski & Limongi, supra note 2. 
40. See Laurence Whitehead, Three International Dimensions of Democratization, in 
T H E INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF DEMOCRATIZATION 3, 5-22 (Laurence Whitehead 
ed., 1996) (discussing military invasions as well as more indirect forms of outside coer-
cion or influence). 
41. See Adam Przeworski, Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy, in 
TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 47, 53-56 (Guil-
lermo O'Donnell et al. eds., 1986). 
42. See id. 
43. See VANHANEN, supra note 38, at 21. 
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for regimes governed by democratic principles.44 This optimism 
has not been without justification, both quantitatively and quali-
tatively speaking.45 
Liberal-minded political theorists also draw comfort from 
exogenous trends when contemplating the prospects for democ-
racy. The systematic loosening of economic controls and persis-
tent lowering of barriers to the flow of goods, services, and capi-
tal, as well as dramatic advances in information technology, have 
been responsible for transforming the previously decentralized 
network of States into a more tightly integrated structure, akin to 
the proverbial "global village," and have rendered it difficult for 
individual countries to exercise a high degree of freedom in 
shaping the evolution of their political systems.46 There has 
been a diffusion of mostly progressive ideas from one part of the 
world to another (predominantly from the core to the periph-
ery), assuming at times the form of a "contagion."47 
The ideas have normally traveled through "neutral" chan-
nels, i.e., in a generally unplanned and ostensibly non-coercive 
manner.4 8 The active promotion of democracy across borders 
has not been an insignificant phenomenon, however, involving 
the selective use of negative sanctions (broadly defined to en-
compass violent means) and positive reinforcement.49 Condi-
tionality has been a particularly interesting variant of this strat-
egy, employed consistently by multilateral institutions, such as 
the Council of Europe, the European Community, and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, which tend to attach specific (political, 
but not exclusively so) conditions to the distribution of concrete 
benefits to recipient countries.50 
Another development viewed positively by students of de-
mocracy is the emergence of elites ("agents") committed to po-
litico-economic modernization.51 It is a moot point whether this 
is an exogenous factor, as is commonly assumed, or an endoge-
nous one in that the players in question could be regarded as 
44. See id. at 166-69. 
45. See id. at 67-79. 
46. See Whitehead, supra note 40, at 18-19. 
47. See id. at 5-8, 21. 
48. See id. at 6. 
49. See id. at 14. 
50. See id. at 30, 42. 
51. See GUILLERMO O ' D O N N E L L ET AL., TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: 
TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN DEMOCRACIES 41 (1986). 
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the product of their environment—international as well as do-
mestic—rather than as inner-driven architects of change. Be 
that as it may, there have been several examples of elite-engi-
neered political liberalization in recent years (the Gorbachev 
"revolution" probably qualifies as the most memorable), includ-
ing in Asia, e.g., South Korea.52 Indeed, some social scientists 
argue that the pattern witnessed is sufficiently well-established to 
be depicted in game-theoretic terms.53 They thus proceed to dis-
sect it by focusing on the strategic interaction, in the course of 
the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, between 
the ruling elite (hardliners and softliners) and the opposition 
elite (moderate democrats and extreme democrats).54 
Agent-centric explanations find favor among observers of 
the contemporary political scene in China. They lay particular 
emphasis on the role of Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader 
who abandoned Mao Zedong's radical experiments and adopted 
more liberal and outward-looking policies.55 Two of his early ini-
tiatives have had far-reaching consequences: agricultural reform 
and the open-door strategy. The former turned millions of land-
less peasants into landowners or equivalent, effectively elevating 
each of them to the status of an independent farmer.56 The lat-
ter transformed key coastal areas into platforms for foreign in-
vestment, encouraging them to overhaul their ossified economic 
systems in the process.57 These two initiatives have propelled the 
country toward capitalism, albeit with "Chinese" characteris-
tics.58 
A notable feature of the sweeping restructuring that has en-
sued has been the restoration of private enterprise and private 
property rights across the industrial spectrum beyond agricul-
ture.59 Not surprisingly, given the policy thrust, the private sec-
tor has outpaced its public counterpart by a wide margin and, as 
52. See ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET 60 (1991); see also White-
head, supra note 40, at 361-67, 370-73. 
53. See id. at 61-66. 
54. See PRZEWORSKI, supra note 52, at 61-66. 
55. See HUGHES, supra note 8, at 7. 
56. SeeYANLAi WANG, CHINA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRATIZATION 113 
(2003). 
57. See id. at 122-27. 
58. See HUGHES, supra note 8, at 187-89. 
59. See WANG, supra note 56, at 166-67. 
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matters stand, overshadows it in many respects.60 Among other 
things, the private sector is the dominant force in consumer 
goods retailing and industrial production.61 It is also a major 
source of employment in both rural and urban areas.62 Last but 
not least, it accounts for a larger portion of the gross domestic 
product than the rapidly shrinking—in relative terms—public 
sector.63 
Deng's economic reforms were by far the most radical, but 
his initiatives were not confined to this particular area. From an 
agent-centric perspective, Sinologists highlight the importance 
of his efforts to build a contingent of cadres capable of imple-
menting his vision over a long period of time.64 He relied on a 
three-pronged strategy to achieve this objective: (1) placing his 
proteges, such as Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, in key positions 
of power; (2) rehabilitating old cadres who were marginalized 
during the Cultural Revolution; and (3) identifying promising 
young cadres and promoting them, when and where appropri-
ate, to positions vacated by their old counterparts.65 
Needless to say, these measures were partly taken in order 
to solidify Deng's power base at the start of the post-Mao era. 
Nevertheless, the desire to create an institutional mechanism for 
sustaining the reform program over several generations was par-
amount. This, however, was not the sole initiative of that kind. 
Deng embraced the de-personalization and re-institutionaliza-
tion of Chinese politics as a goal and moved consistently in this 
direction—albeit varying the pace on tactical grounds—by en-
deavoring to revive formal institutions at national, regional, and 
local levels and inject a modicum of accountability and even 
transparency into the public decision-making process.66 This 
pattern has remained intact following his death, possibly sug-
gesting that democracy will materialize before long.67 
The endogenous side of the picture is viewed as more, 
rather than less, reassuring. Deng may have provided the initial 
60. See id. 
61. See id. 
62. See id. 
63. See id. 
64. See id, at 104-05. 
65. See id. 
66. See id. at 113, 224-25. 
67. See id. at 140. 
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impetus for multi-faceted structural transformation, but events 
may have overtaken his vision. Politico-economic evolution may 
be faster, broader, and deeper than he anticipated. China seems 
to be progressing in accordance with the logic of modernization 
theory and the Communist Party leadership is playing a largely 
reactive role.68 It may engage in policy fine-tuning; yet, the pre-
vailing opinion is that, absent a dictatorial counter-revolution—a 
highly unlikely prospect—the room for maneuver that China en-
joys at this stage of development is distinctly limited. It may not 
be able to switch course, but merely to "lean against the wind."69 
The constraints are apparently becoming increasingly evi-
dent at the grass-roots level. Modernization may have reshaped 
the social environment to a point whereby people in all walks of 
life are displaying attitudes that are not consistent with those tra-
ditionally attributed to them by students of Chinese political cul-
ture.70 Authoritarianism, fear of politics, ignorance of politics, 
intolerance, and passivity seem to have diminished signifi-
cantly.71 Instead, one observes greater assertiveness, critical dis-
position, liberalism, open-mindedness, and a sense of indepen-
dence.7 2 The sentiments exhibited may be converging rapidly 
with those seen in democratic settings.73 
Such attitudinal shifts often herald the erosion of the legiti-
macy of authoritarian regimes, eventually bringing about their 
demise. This pattern was witnessed in South Korea in the late 
1980s, when a powerful mass movement played a pivotal role in 
remodeling the political system.74 The Chinese ruling elite 
proved more resilient during the same period in the face of stu-
dent protest at Tiananmen Square.75 Yet, it has been suggested 
that such a violent response, and subsequent consolidation of 
power, would have probably been impossible in the present cul-
tural climate or at the current stage of development.76 
68. See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 190 
(2002); see also WANG, supra note 56, at 224. 
69. See HUGHES, supra note 8, at 185; see also WANG, supra note 56, at 225. 
70. See ANDREW J. NATHAN, CHINESE DEMOCRACY 235-55 (1986). 
71. See WANG, supra note 56, at 192-211. 
72. See id. 
73. See id. 
74. See RONALD INGI.F.HART, MODERNIZATION AND P O S I MODERNIZATION: CULTURAL, 
ECONOMIC:, AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN 43 SOCIETIES 179 (1997). 
75. See WANG, supra note 56, at 128. 
76. See id. at 184. 
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There are thus compelling arguments in support of the pro-
position that China is in the midst of a transition that will inevita-
bly culminate in the adoption of democratic ideals and the insti-
tutions embodying them. After all, the vision of Deng Xiaoping, 
the architect of the post-1998 modernization drive, and even 
that of Mao Zedong, the consummate practitioner of "perpetual 
revolution," incorporated elements of this scenario ("full trust in 
the general public," "seeking truth from facts," and "promoting 
democracy").77 Those who subscribe to it may indeed turn out 
to be right in the long run. The question is whether that is a 
realistic prospect from a medium-term (five to ten-year) perspec-
tive. 
The exogenous notion of a cohesive army of cadres firmly 
committed to liberalization across the policy spectrum may legit-
imately be challenged. As Harry Harding has observed, political 
reform is underway, but its pace has been slow. He has noted 
the following developments over the past two decades: The prin-
cipal goal of the Communist Party is now to promote economic 
development, rather than foster continual class struggle, as was 
the case during the Maoist era.78 By the same token, the ruling 
elite is more technocratic and more civilian in character.79 A 
large number of officials have tertiary education, albeit primarily 
of the engineering variety.80 Significantly, fewer and fewer posi-
tions in the Politburo and the Central Committee, let alone the 
State Council, are occupied by the previously omnipresent mili-
tary.81 The bureaucracy formulates alternative strategic options 
with meaningful input from specialists in research institutions 
and universities.82 The options generally reflect a preference for 
cautious, incremental, and pragmatic approaches to policy man-
agement, rather than Utopian designs to overhaul the social 
structure.83 
The legal system is also being gradually enhanced. The 
State does not just increasingly govern through the adoption 
77. See NATHAN, supra note 70, at 7; see also WANG, supra note 56, at 224-25. 
78. See Harry Harding, The Halting Advance of Pluralism, 9 J. DEMOCRACY 11, 12 
(1998). 
79. See id. 
80. See id. 
81. See id. 
82. See id. 
83. See id. 
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and implementation of laws and regulations, but those legal in-
struments are beginning to constrain State behavior.84 Even the 
most strategically placed officials are subject to limited terms of 
office.85 Citizens are suing the State for malfeasance.86 Courts 
are occasionally overturning the recommendations of State pros-
ecutors.87 Elsewhere in the public domain, credible elections 
are becoming common in rural areas.88 The process is largely 
confined to executive membership in village councils, yet it ex-
tends selectively to legislative bodies at higher levels.89 In several 
places, the elections appear to be more competitive and the 
nomination exercise less tightly controlled by the Party than 
originally envisioned.90 
Legislatures can scarcely be portrayed as independent, but 
they display greater initiative than in the past, particularly at the 
provincial and national levels. Meetings are held more or less 
regularly, and the National People's Congress has a reasonably 
effective committee and staff structure.91 Occasionally, legisla-
tures reject Party nominees to executive positions, and delay or 
modify proposals originating from bureaucratic/Party sources.92 
In addition, there has been a proliferation of non-governmental 
organizations, especially professional associations and entities 
geared to the provision of social services.93 
To conclude that such modest displays of professional ori-
entation, respect for due process, or pluralistic spirit amount to 
a manifestation of a strong determination to carry out systemati-
cally far-reaching democratic reforms in the foreseeable future, 
however, would arguably qualify as a poorly-timed quantum leap 
of faith. China's ruling elite has had ample opportunity to 
demonstrate its commitment to a moderate liberal agenda in the 
Hong Kong—and, to a lesser extent, Taiwan—context. Yet, at 
every juncture , it has failed to respond in a reassuring fashion to 
the challenge, invariably opting to hinder progress toward de-
84. See id. 
85. See id. 
86. See id. 
87. See id. 
88. See id. 
89. See id. 
90. See id. 
91. See id. 
92. See id. 
93. See id, at 13. 
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mocracy, often employing heavy-handed tactics in the process, 
rather than to facilitate it in a balanced manner.9 4 
For this reason, it may be appropriate to continue to equate 
the present political configuration in China with "market-pre-
serving authoritarianism."95 This term is used to capture the es-
sence of a regime resting on twin pillars that are normally 
thought to be conflicting, as distinct from merely non-identical: 
political authoritarianism and preference for free markets. Such 
a combination is quite common from a historical perspective. It 
has prevailed in Meiji, Japan; the German Second Reich; the pre-
democratized "four little dragons" in East Asia (Hong Kong, Sin-
gapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) from the early 1960s to the 
late 1980s; Franco's Spain in the 1960s and the early 1970s; Bot-
swana, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand since the 1970s; and 
Chile and Ghana since the 1980s.96 
Indeed, some Sinologists, admittedly a minority, claim that 
the current Chinese institutional set-up has not yet evolved to a 
point whereby it can be identified, in an unqualified fashion, 
with market-preserving authoritarianism.97 In the industrial 
realm, the reassignment of decision rights and residual claims 
from the central agent (government) to the inside members of 
the firm (managers and workers) has afforded the latter a de-
gree of discretion. Nevertheless, the incentive structure has not 
been reshaped sufficiently to produce dramatic results. Moreo-
ver, further headway on that front hinges on an effective transfer 
of authority for selecting managers from bureaucrats to capital-
ists, or a wholesale privatization of State-owned enterprises, and 
the ability and willingness of the central agent to confront this 
challenge decisively remains uncertain.98 
Market-preserving authoritarianism need not be harsh in 
nature. Rather, it may evolve into a "softer" variety. This ap-
pears to be the direction in which China is presently headed. An 
unmistakable shift may be discerned from an "uninhibited politi-
94. See Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, The Political Economy of Constitutional Con-
flict in Hong Kong, 11 TILBURG FOREIGN L. REV. 756, 757 (2003). 
95. Miron Mushkat, Economic Reform, Discontinuous Change, and China's Future, 2 
PERSP. GLOBAL. DF.V. & TECH. 255, 261 (2003) (quoting Shuhe Li & Peng Lian, Decentrali-
zation and Coordination: China's Credible Commitment to Preserve the Market Under Authorita-
rianism, 10 CHINA ECON. REV. 161, 168 (1999)). 
96. See id. at 261-62. 
97. See id. at 262. 
98. See id. 
244 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:229 
cal center with transformative policies toward an inhibited 
center with accommodative policies."99 The former constitutes 
the core of a totalitarian State seeking to purify morally the in-
ner lives of its citizens. The latter serves as the mainstay of an 
authoritarian regime to which the Chinese people have long 
been accustomed. It existed in Taiwan before the democratiza-
tion of the last two decades and in China during many centuries 
of the imperial era.100 
The inhibited center is organizationally incapable of closely 
directing the activities of citizens. They view it as promulgating 
an essentially correct doctrine, which it cannot implement 
fully.101 It thus enjoys a form of fragmentary legitimacy and op-
erates in an ideologically eclectic fashion.102 The ambiguities 
and contradictions to which this pattern gives rise notwithstand-
ing, it achieves stability by forbidding resolutely what would qual-
ify as free political activity. There is no solid evidence to suggest 
that the ruling elite is pursuing a strategic agenda whose ulti-
mate purpose is to convert the inhibited center into a "subordi-
nated" one, i.e., an institution guided by the freely expressed will 
of the voters.103 
The path taken seems to lead to a configuration best de-
scribed as "authoritarian pluralism." This regime type may be 
defined as a system wherein political life remains under the un-
challenged control of a dominant-party or single-party appara-
tus. Strict limits are placed on liberty (albeit with some possible 
circumstantial variations) and military or national security or-
gans monitor socio-political trends carefully. At the same time, 
however, a civil society is allowed to function apart from the 
State. The various segments of this social body exercise a certain 
degree of autonomy and are thus able to reflect diverse interests. 
Moreover, the economy is mixed, with the market playing an in-
creasingly pivotal role.104 
Cultural transformation has not reached a stage whereby re-
lentless demands for radical change could undermine the status 
99. Thomas A. Metzger, Sources of Resistance, 9 J. DEMOCRACY 18, 20 (1998). 
100. See id. 
101. See id. 
102. See id. 
103. See id. 
104. See Robert A. Scalapino, Current Trends and Future Prospects, 9 J. DEMOCRACY 35, 
38 (1998). 
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quo. The attitudinal patterns seen in public opinion surveys 
conducted in recent years differ markedly from those witnessed 
a decade or so ago.105 Chinese people display positive self-con-
sciousness on a scale that is remarkable by previous standards.106 
They also appear to favor a freer press, greater reliance on the 
rule of law, and less passive legislatures.107 The sentiments ex-
hibited are, however, broadly consistent with authoritarian plu-
ralism of the benevolent variety (a lapse into malevolence could 
prove problematic), and there are no clear indications of rapidly 
growing support for independent political organizations and 
competitive elections.108 
Thomas Metzger has suggested that the Taiwan experience, 
while illuminating, may not provide an appropriate basis for ex-
trapolation in this case. After all, as Metzger has noted, Taiwan 
embarked on its modernization drive with an inhibited political 
center, whereas the mainland took the same step with a distinctly 
uninhibited one.109 The powers that be in Beijing also enjoy the 
dignity derived from their status as the rulers of a unified China 
at peace ("the mandate of Heaven"), while their Taipei counter-
parts had less room for maneuver because of the lack of this dig-
nity and to rising Taiwanese nationalism.110 
Another notable difference lies in the ideological contexts 
of the two regimes. The Maoist ideology drew strength (it still 
selectively does) from Mao's charisma, the powerful saga of the 
communist revolution, and the prestige of Marxism as a philoso-
phy not merely in accord with the revered May Fourth Move-
ment but one viewed seriously in intellectual circles, East and 
West.111 By contrast, Taiwan's Sunist ideology was at odds with 
the May Fourth spirit, commanded no worldwide attention, and 
was an eclectic mode of thought much more compatible with the 
acceptance of market-embedded logic than the ideological mo-
saic observed in China.112 
Further, by incorporating the ideal of democracy and en-
105. See WANG, supra note 56, at 207. 
106. See id. at 207. 
107. See Harding, supra note 78, at 15. 
108. See id. at 15. 
109. See Metzger, supra note 99, at 23. 
110. See id. at 23. 
111. See id. 
112. See id. at 23-24. 
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dorsing the Confucian tradition with its propensity toward "pro-
test in the name of righteousness," Sunism was rhetorically vul-
nerable to a process of spiritual mobilization aimed at securing 
universal franchise.113 Thus, arguments in favor of political 
gradualism are quite respectable in China today, and are even 
advanced comfortably by academic analysts and independent 
professionals, but such arguments in authoritarian Taiwan could 
be put forward only by those brave enough to incur the wrath of 
"true intellectuals" demanding democracy.114 
From an external perspective, Taiwan was considerably 
more influenced by American culture than China has been or is 
likely to be, and its precarious international position rendered it 
highly vulnerable to liberal pressures from Washington (the ad-
ministration and the U.S. Congress) and U.S. media.115 In Tai-
wan, some key political groups were also attracted to the post-
World War II Japanese model and shared democratic ideals with 
liberal circles in Japan.1 lb Perhaps even more significant was the 
desire of the Taipei ruling elite, at least by the 1980s, to "up-
stage" the mainland by successfully importing Western-style capi-
talism and democracy.117 Its Beijing counterpart displays far 
greater ambivalence toward symbols of Western civilization.118 
For the latter, importation of ideas has the humiliating im-
plication that the mainland is merely following in Taiwan's foot-
steps. The vision it prefers is that of "transcending the West" 
(and, of course, Taiwan) by realizing a version of modernity dif-
ferent from and superior to the Western variety.119 By the same 
token, the dark Chinese image of the West as a developmental 
model to be avoided has been much more prominent in main-
land than in Taiwanese intellectual and policy circles.120 This 
less-than-appealing image also meshes with a nationalistic out-
look fairly common on the mainland but quite rare in Taiwan. 
According to this view, China rivals the United States as a Nation 
projecting its power abroad to an excessive degree.121 
113. See id. at 24. 
114. See id. 
115. See id. 
116. See id. 
117. See id. 
118. See id. 
119. See id. 
120. See id. 
121. See id. 
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China's size and the complexity of the problems it confronts 
widen the gap to a point whereby the quest for a potentially 
credible historical analogy simply reaches an analytical cul-de-
sac. After all, most of the mainland provinces have a population 
larger than Taiwan.122 To make matters worse, its impressive 
post-1978 record notwithstanding, China faces daunting obsta-
cles to continued rapid economic expansion: shortages of ara-
ble land and potable water; bottlenecks in agriculture, educa-
tion, and energy; vast quantities of surplus labor; serious air, soil, 
and water pollution; and a steadily aging workforce.123 
Removing these obstacles will require massive financial re-
sources. Yet, despite its high savings rate, strong export perform-
ance, and enormous foreign-exchange reserves, China's banking 
system verges on insolvency, and its fiscal apparatus extracts dis-
tinctly modest tax revenues relative to gross domestic product 
("GDP").124 To address these challenges responsibly through 
more stringent financial discipline would almost certainly mean 
lower growth and higher unemployment. To address them irre-
sponsibly through lax fiscal and lending policies would inevitably 
lead to galloping inflation, followed by social instability. A rul-
ing elite sensitive to the risks involved is not likely to pursue po-
litical decentralization in a determined fashion and, barring a 
severe crisis of confidence, the clamor for democracy emanating 
from the grass-roots may remain muted.125 
The endogenous side of the picture may also be more com-
plicated than generally assumed. The collapse of communist 
dictatorships in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe may have 
been the result of their failure to fulfill their part of the "social 
contract."12 ' ' As has been amply documented, the fusion of eco-
nomics and politics under communism in that part of the world 
turned the persistent inability to satisfy economic needs into a 
moment of political opportunity, precipitating the disintegration 
of authoritarian regimes (an exogenous shock paving the way for 
endogenous transformation).127 
122. See Harding, supra note 78, at 15. 
123. See id. at 15. 
124. See id. at 15-16. 
125. See id. at 16. 
126. See Mary E. Gallagher, Reform and Openness: Why China's Economic Reforms Have 
Delayed Democracy, 54 WORLD POL. 338, 338 (2002). 
127. See VALERIE BUNCE, SUBVERSIVE INSTITUTIONS: T H E DESIGN AND THE DESTRUC-
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The interplay between economics and politics followed a 
different pattern in East Asia (more consistent with the classical 
endogenous model), but the overall social dynamics assumed a 
broadly similar form in that stimuli originating from the eco-
nomic arena provided the impetus for changes on the political 
front. Spectacular output expansion sowed the seeds of all-em-
bracing modernization, culminating in the adoption of demo-
cratic institutions.128 A burgeoning middle class was a notable 
by-product of the process and so was the rise of social move-
ments concerned with the negative externalities of uncontrolled 
growth, including environmental degradation, government cor-
ruption, and labor exploitation.129 
The relationship between economics and politics has 
proved more ambiguous in the Chinese context. The open-door 
strategy has been the centerpiece of the reform program. The 
liberalization of foreign direct investment ("FDI") thus consti-
tuted the first and most crucial step in the gradual dismantling 
of the command economy.130 Unlike in the Soviet Union/Rus-
sia, Eastern Europe, and East Asia, neither the privatization of 
State-owned enterprises nor the development of an indigenous 
business class loomed large on the policy agenda during the 
early phases of modernization.131 Even at this late juncture, pro-
gress in this direction remains halting.132 
The contrast with the experience of the other East Asian 
countries—-Japan, Korea, and Taiwan—is particularly notewor-
thy. Although their growth trajectories and industrial structures 
are by no means uniform, the economies in the region were 
built on a strong domestic business class, often closely allied with 
TION OF SOCIALISM AND THE STATE 131 (1999) (noting that the fusion between politics 
and economics redistributed power along with economic resources, thus allowing so-
cialist societies to become more autonomous and powerful when bargaining with the 
party-State); see also KATHERINE VERDERY, W H A T WAS SOCIALISM AND WHAT COMES NEXT? 
33 (1996) (discussing how "political capitalists" exploited shortages to their own politi-
cal gain). 
128. See Harold Crouch & James W. Morley, The Dynamics of Political Change, in 
DRIVEN BY GROWTH: POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION 313, 327 (James W. 
Morley ed., 1999) (finding that economic expansion tipped the internal balance of 
power, causing authoritarian rule to give way to fundamental democratic transforma-
tions in several Asian Pacific countries). 
129. See id. at 324-25. 
130. See Gallagher, supra no te 126, at 339. 
131. See id. at 361-70. 
132. See id, at 371-72. 
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an interventionist State.133 Foreign participation was extremely 
low despite the pronounced export-orientation displayed in 
each case.134 Most notably, FDI was strictly controlled and delib-
erately relegated to the industrial periphery.135 As pointed out, 
China has opted to follow a different path, liberalizing access for 
foreign capital but stifling its domestic counterpart.136 
This has had the effect of limiting and delaying democratic 
reforms, at least in the medium-term. The business classes in 
Korea and Taiwan may have not played the historical role of 
ideologically-enlightened bourgeoisie, as witnessed in similar cir-
cumstances in Europe, but their increasing autonomy rendered 
the "united front" of authoritarian government and domestic 
capitalism eventually untenable.137 In China, however, the pri-
vate sector is ill-equipped to act as an agent of social change. 
Relatively modest in size and heavily dependent on local govern-
ment support for survival, it really still is in its infancy, aggregate 
statistics suggesting otherwise notwithstanding.138 In surpris-
ingly intriguing ways, FDI has thus become a substitute for do-
mestic private enterprise, reinforcing rather than undermining 
the political status quo.1 3 9 
The unconventional sequencing of economic reforms (FDI 
first, privatization later) has hindered progress toward democ-
racy in another, equally important, respect. The foreign-in-
vested sector of the economy has been transformed into a labo-
ratory of capitalism. Its dynamism has provided the State with 
sufficient political space to enact difficult and destabilizing re-
forms without provoking a backlash.140 In addition, key ele-
ments of society that stood to lose substantially from economic 
restructuring, particularly the urban working class, have been 
fragmented in the process and have not been able to operate as 
a cohesive political force. FDI has unleashed powerful competi-
tive pressures among regions, industries, firms, professions, and 
employees within organizations, diluting significantly the power 
133. See id. al 345. 
134. See id. 
135. See id. at 345-55. 
136. See id. at 345. 
137. See id. at 346. 
138. See id. 
139. See id. 
140. See id. at 355-56. 
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base of segments of society potentially capable of challenging 
the regime.141 
The FDI-centered strategy of development has also resulted 
in great inequalities, particularly among different parts of the 
country (the disparities between the coastal areas and the hinter-
land being perhaps the most striking).142 Convergence theorists 
argue that this is a natural phenomenon and that the gap will 
narrow over time due to the inevitable acceleration in growth of 
the poorer regions.143 Analysts who favor the inverted U-curve 
hypothesis and view development as a seesaw process featuring 
shifts in the position of leading and lagging regions are not un-
duly concerned either.144 They acknowledge that the swings are 
triggered by two opposite sets of forces, known as "spread" and 
"backwash," or alternatively "trickling down" and "polarization" 
effects, but tend to assume that the ones supporting the eradica-
tion of inequalities—namely, spread/trickling down—will pre-
vail in the China context.145 
This may well prove to be the case in the long run when the 
country enters a more mature stage of economic growth. As 
matters stand, however, regional disparities are very wide and 
government policy is not geared sufficiently to minimizing, let 
alone eliminating, them.146 Lack of resolve is merely one aspect 
of the problem, because it is a moot point whether the capabili-
ties exist to address the challenge effectively. The pattern is thus 
likely to persist for the foreseeable future.147 And as long as it 
does, the Chinese modernization drive will probably continue to 
feature further marketization of the economy but without mean-
ingful democratic reforms. 
III. THE RULE OF LAW FACTOR 
The shift from an uninhibited political center to an inhib-
ited one, highlighted earlier, qualifies as a landmark develop-
ment in China's post-World War II history. There is no logical 
141. See id. at 371. 
142. See id. at 350. 
143. See WANG SHAOGUANG & Hu ANGANG, T H E POLITICAL ECONOMY OF UNEVEN 
DEVELOPMENT: T H E CASE OF CHINA 21 (1999). 
144. See id. at 28-35. 
145. See id. at 29. 
146. See id. at 203-04. 
147. See id. at 206. 
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basis for implying otherwise. Indeed, the self-imposed principles 
governing the conduct of senior cadres and providing the frame-
work for regulating behavior in the public domain may have 
crystallized and may have become embedded in the institutional 
fabric to a point whereby one may have to acknowledge that the 
restraint displayed and the apparent desire to reduce materially 
the scope for arbitrary official action may be indicative of a will-
ingness to embrace before long democratic practices in a form 
and on a scale that would be inconsistent with the conclusion 
drawn in the previous section. 
Such willingness is possibly reflected in the Party Constitu-
tion and the 1982 Constitution, both of which confirm the basic 
tenets of a government of laws, the supremacy of the law, and 
equality of all before the law.148 Moreover, in 1996, the Chinese 
leadership adopted the new tifa, or official policy formulation of 
ruling the country in accordance with the law and establishing a 
socialist rule-of-law State, which was subsequently incorporated 
into the Constitution.149 This could be viewed as merely the tip 
of the post-1978 legal iceberg. Given the heavy reliance on Party 
directives rather than the law during the Mao era, China lacked 
even the most fundamental legal instruments, such as a compre-
hensive criminal code, civil law, and contract law.150 The re-
sponse to the legal vacuum has been a legislative onslaught 
whose breadth and pace have been simply extraordinary.151 
Considerable attention has also been accorded to institu-
tion-building. The Ministry of Justice has been re-established, 
law schools have been re-opened, and numerous legal journals 
have been launched.152 The government has gone to some 
lengths to restore State legal organs and promote greater profes-
sionalization of judges, procurators, lawyers, and police of-
ficers.133 Substantial resources have been channeled toward le-
gal dissemination and consciousness-raising.154 Perhaps the 
most compelling argument in support of the notion that China 
has jettisoned Mao-style "rule of man" is that the law has 
148. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 68, at 88-89. 
149. See id. at 59-60. 
150. See id. at 43-46. 
151. See id. at 239. 
152. See id. at 6-7. 
153. See id. at 13-15, 350-61. 
154. See id. at 7. 
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emerged as a force to be reckoned with in daily life. For exam-
ple, citizens are increasingly willing to challenge the government 
through administrative reconsideration and litigation; moreover, 
they are encountering a reasonable degree of success in the pro-
cess.155 
Yet, while there are concrete signs that China is in the midst 
of a transition to a moderately diluted form of the rule of law, 
there is no dearth of evidence suggesting that the legal system is 
akin in many respects to a variant featuring rule by law rather 
than rule o/law.156 After all, the significant progress observed 
notwithstanding, the actual reach of the law remains fairly lim-
ited.157 
Most notably, the Party's role in shaping and implementing 
the policy agenda is inconsistent with or not provided for in the 
Constitution and other legal documents.158 Quite often, Party 
actions continue to violate laws, at times flagrantly so.159 The 
nomenklatura system, which is the product of the Party's insis-
tence on appointing or at least vetoing the appointment of key 
members of representative bodies and courts, undermines the 
authority, independence, and legitimacy of the legislature and 
the judiciary.160 By the same token, senior Party officials are sub-
ject to disciplinary measures, if any, by Party committees rather 
than the courts, in blatant contravention of the fundamental 
rule-of-law principle that those wielding power and ordinary peo-
ple should be treated equally.161 Moreover, the government per-
sists with steps impeding civil society and political dissidents are 
routinely denied their legal rights.162 
This may well be an interim phase during which the previ-
ously uninhibited center adjusts slowly to the culture of inhibi-
tion that is gradually emerging. There are indications that 
China is firmly committed to "social mobilization for moder-
155. See id. at 404. 
156. The former refers to an instrumental conception of the legal system whereby 
the law is merely a tool to be employed as the State deems fit; the latter reflects the 
ability of the legal system to impose tangible restraints on the State and members of the 
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nity."163 This involves Nation-building (mechanic solidarity), 
market-building (organic solidarity), and State-building (an ad-
vanced form of government that would replace the dominance 
of traditional authority underpinned by patron-client networks 
with legal-rational authority).164 State-building inspired by the 
Weberian notion of legal-rational authority is not inconsistent 
with steady progress, even if uneven in the initial stages, toward 
the rule of law.165 
The ultimate destination, to the extent that it can be dis-
cerned, is apparently an ambitious six-pillar structure including 
a neutral civil service, an autonomous judiciary, elaborate social 
consultation procedures (to ensure that the civil service operates 
within a framework of checks-and-balances rooted in the com-
munity), an independent anti-corruption body, a powerful audit 
unit, and extensive civil liberties (the freedoms of assembly, asso-
ciation, press, and speech being the most prominent).1 6 6 All the 
components of this structure serve as the mainstay of liberal-
democratic regimes, but the strong emphasis placed on social 
consultation—as distinct from political representation—in the 
China context is fairly unique from a comparative perspective. It 
may thus be argued that the institutional configuration envi-
sioned will eventually display attributes of a "consultative rule of 
law system."167 
Interestingly, such a system is not without precedent in the 
history of Chinese civilization. Specifically, the country had a le-
galist tradition—the "Law School of Thought," which was con-
ceived by Guan Zhong, a Seventh Century B.C. Prime Minister of 
the State of Qi—exhibiting broadly similar characteristics.168 It 
exerted considerable influence on China's legal environment 
until the Liu Che period in the Han Dynasty, which saw the rise 
of another powerful school of thought, Confucianism, around 
130 B.C., more than 2000 years ago.169 The rule of law can be 
said to have prevailed during that stretch of five centuries, 
163. Wei Pan, Toward a Consultative Rule of Law Regime in China, 12 J. CONTEMP. 
CHINA 3, 29 {2003). 
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broadly speaking, and it was reinforced with consultative mecha-
nisms designed to secure proper feedback from the people and 
their "representatives."170 
The sense of historical continuity notwithstanding, a con-
sultative rule of law system is not about to emerge in China. It 
remains an institutional blueprint whose implementation may 
extend over decades rather than years. More importantly, the 
blueprint is not part of a comprehensive strategy to move in an 
orderly fashion toward full-fledged democracy. Quite the con-
trary, a consultative rule of law system is proposed as an alterna-
tive to genuinely representative government.171 For Chinese 
constitutional architects, the establishment of legal-rational au-
thority seems to mark, Weber-style, the completion of moderni-
zation. To state it differently, a country can be "modern" with-
out embracing democracy.172 The corollary is that the rule of 
law, even if it materializes sooner rather than later, will not nec-
essarily pave the way for a regime embodying the principles of 
universal franchise and led by popularly elected officials. 
CONCLUSION 
In the past quarter of a century, China has lowered dramati-
cally the barriers to the flow of goods, services, and capital. It 
has also shifted decisively from a highly centralized economic 
structure to one featuring a reasonably high degree of decentral-
ization. It remains to be seen whether the trend is irreversible 
and it is debatable whether the proverbial glass is half full or half 
empty. The prevailing view is that close integration into the 
global economy is inevitable, particularly following accession to 
the World Trade Organization, and that market forces will con-
tinue to gain momentum, emerging before long as the principal 
resource allocation mechanism.173 Those who challenge the 
consensus are a distinct minority in the academic community.174 
Foreign and domestic sector reform, particularly the for-
170. See id. 
171. See id. 
172. See id. at 29. 
173. See Karen Halverson, China's WTO Accession: Economic, Legal, and Political Im-
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mer, has reignited the previously stalled economic engine.173 
The rate of output expansion has been consistently high—in-
deed, often excessively so—for such a large country.176 While 
the development strategy remains unorthodox and the policy 
thrust is still open to conflicting interpretations, the economy is 
clearly undergoing modernization, in the qualitative as well as 
the quantitative sense of the term. Fundamental shifts in atti-
tudes, behavior, organizational forms, and relationship patterns 
can also be observed in other spheres of social activity. 
It would be tempting to conclude that socio-economic trans-
formation is so broad-based and far-reaching that the process of 
structural change is nearing its final phase: political liberaliza-
tion that will result in the emergence of viable democratic insti-
tutions. This scenario may not be about to materialize, but it is 
nevertheless commonly assumed that it constitutes a realistic 
prospect from a medium-term perspective. We have endeavored 
to demonstrate that such lofty expectations, which are reflected 
in the academic literature and the media, cannot be readily justi-
fied. The picture does not strictly conform to the endogenous 
model of modernization, and the scope for redrawing it by 
resorting to exogenous analytical devices is rather limited. 
Indeed, the interplay between economics and politics in 
China continues to defy conventional wisdom. Robert Dahl's 
notion of "polyarchy" may provide a framework for highlighting 
the persistence of authoritarian inertia, although of the soft vari-
ety, in an otherwise semi-modern setting. According to Dahl, a 
polity develops along two principal dimensions: participation 
and contestation.177 While the former relates to the issue of 
"who" is included among the political classes, the latter deter-
mines "what" constitutes the essence of politics: the nature and 
limits of political competition.178 A country may move toward 
polyarchy along either axis, sometimes by choice, and sometimes 
because of factors (external, internal, or a combination of the 
175. See Valentin A. Povarchuk, Russian Draft Law on Special Economic Zones—A Step 
Forward, But Not Far Enough, 13 PAC. RIM L. & P O L ' Y J . 351, 361 (2004). 
176. See Jian Zhou, National Treatment in Foreign Investment Law: A Comparative Study 
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177. See ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY 33-40 (1971). 
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two) beyond its control.179 
Yet, in a country where the ruling elite maintains a firm grip 
on society, it may not move at all. Currently, this appears to be 
the case in China, given that participation has been frozen at the 
level of village elections for more than a decade, and contesta-
tion, which was tentatively in evidence during the early reform 
period, has been nipped in the bud.180 The measure of benevo-
lence and self-restraint displayed by the power holders notwith-
standing, in some crucial respects China today resembles to a 
greater extent Dahl's "closed hegemony" than an evolving poly-
archy and it is not inappropriate to equate the absence of elite 
contestation with the "end-of-politics" syndrome.181 
There are two key aspects to the "anti-political" orientation. 
One is the rejection of a pluralism of interests and viewpoints in 
favor of a putative and exigent unity of purpose.182 Differences 
are denied rather than reconciled. Consequently the second is 
the search for an imposition of a singular form of rationality or a 
unitary principle onto political debate. In this new rationality, 
certain ideas, e.g., international best practice, are accorded stra-
tegic importance, whereas others, e.g., respecting ancestral tradi-
tion, are de-legitimized.183 There is, of course, nothing particu-
larly Chinese about this phenomenon , as many political philoso-
phies since the Enlightenment have sought to identify the best 
unitary principle, rejecting the indeterminacy and instability of 
democratic politics in which a people makes its own choices on 
the basis of equality.184 
Bruce Gilley posits that these two aspects of the end-of-polit-
ics syndrome—an emphasis on the unity of interests and a unita-
rian principle—are playing a pivotal role in shaping policy in 
early Twenty-First Century China in the concrete form of the 
doctrine of economyism and the doctrine of proceduralism. 
The former is a legacy of Marxist thinking, as well as possibly the 
Chinese tradition of this earthly thinking. It has gradually be-
179. See id.; see also Michael McFaul, The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship, 
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come the main element in the strategic equation regarding Tai-
wan, Tibet, State enterprise reform, urban unrest, and much else 
since the mid-1990s.185 Economyism rests on the assumption 
that the enormous challenges of the spirit that threaten Party 
rule can be addressed by changing economic conditions and 
thereby re-adjusting spirits, that are merely derivative.186 Thus, 
while politics is viewed as divisive and representing "partial" in-
terests, economic development inevitably promotes harmony 
and represents "overall interests."187 
Proceduralism reflects the belief that the residual decisions 
should be handled by means of processes that are insensitive to 
outcomes.188 This is the new superior rational norm guiding 
China's agents of modernization. Laws and regulations are ex-
pected to function like a Hobbesian sovereign, imposing order 
on a system of self-seeking operators, with unavoidably beneficial 
consequences.189 Proceduralism is a prerequisite for "technoc-
racy"—a cohesive politico-bureaucratic elite driven by markets 
and scientific expertise.190 Again, there is nothing particularly 
Chinese about this institutional pattern, which can be traced to 
the French revolutionary philosopher Saint-Simon, who claimed 
that society should be organized along industrial lines with scien-
tists serving as spiritual leaders.191 
Constitutionalism—or, more broadly speaking, the rule of 
law—is thus to a considerable extent a mechanism for establish-
ing a reign of quiescence over those who would contest. It is a 
framework stripped of the political life that renders constitutions 
powerful devices for fostering deliberative agreements in open 
polities. In the wrong set of circumstances, it may be employed 
to fortify a dictatorial regime, as evidenced by the prominence of 
constitutionalism during the Marcos era (1972 to 1986) in the 
Philippines.192 With the elimination of political competition 
that underpins effective constitutions, proceduralism may turn 
into a de facto entrenchment of the strong.193 For this reason, a 
185. See Gilley, supra note 180, at 125. 
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degree of caution is warranted in interpreting quasi-democratic 
experiments and efforts to advance the rule of law in China, the 
endogenous and exogenous arguments to the contrary notwith-
standing. 
